on movement capture and diversity of tactics

Introduction

I feel obligated to start this post with an unequivocal apology to the organizers who were against the Cop City Referendum Campaign. Naively, I assumed that there was no downside to the strategy and embraced the "diversity of tactics" approach. It is clear now that this was the wrong position. I apologize not only to the organizers who cautioned us about this eventuality, but anyone who signed the petition, donated their time and/or money, or otherwise endorsed the referendum because of my public stance. In itself, it isn't enough, but I offer this post as the first step to repair whatever damage my position may have caused.

On June 7, 2023, organizers in Atlanta announced a campaign aimed at allowing voters to decide the fate of Cop City with a ballot referendum. In essence, for the issue to make it onto the ballot in time for the election, organizers needed signatures from 15% of the city of Atlanta's registered voters (approximately 58,000 signatures) in sixty days. From the start, this time crunch proved to be a significant obstacle. To alleviate some of this stress, a lawsuit was filed in early July which sought to allow individuals who were not City of Atlanta residents to collect signatures for the referendum.

The trial court quickly returned a favorable ruling, and the signature collection effort grew to encompass non-resident canvassers. While the trial court's ruling itself seemed to be a victory for the referendum campaign, an unforeseen byproduct of the decision was confusion over what that meant for the 60-day deadline. Organizers, contending that the 60-day deadline started over upon the trial court's ruling, maintained that their submission of signatures fell within the statutory timeframe. The ever-litigious City of Atlanta disagreed and refused to count the signatures, claiming that the organizers had missed the original August 21st deadline for submission. The city would go on to appeal the trial court's ruling to the 11th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals. The waiting game had begun.

And so we waited... and waited... and waited some more. All the while the walls of Cop City continued to be erected, the roads of its mock city paved, and the cost to the city climbed as the Atlanta Police Department maintained the necessity of 24/7 officer surveillance of the site from every possible vantage point. The Federal Appellate Court didn't need to issue a ruling to solidify what was already apparent: the City of Atlanta had won. Adding insult to injury, the City of Atlanta illegally published the petition signers' names and phone numbers in an appalling display of force, a brazen act which the already reeling referendum campaign had no answer for.

An aura of confusion has dogged the campaign, which is a product of a general lack of transparency as to who is directing the campaign, how the campaign is funded, and what the campaign is even doing. When it came to media coverage, there was seemingly no shortage of individuals willing to step in front of a microphone to promote the referendum campaign. Yet when the City of Atlanta published the names and phone numbers of tens of thousands of petition signers, no one could get a clear answer on what, if anything, the referendum campaign was going to do about it. People who were justifiably fearful of reprisal due to their now public endorsement of an anti-police campaign did not know who to turn to with their questions or concerns. Rather than address the tangible risk to community members who signed the petition, the campaign seemed more focused on hollow attempts at internet virality.

The campaign's most recent pivot to electioneering for city council candidates to replace the old guard responsible for greenlighting Cop City has eroded what little faith people had left. The referendum campaign began with a specific purpose: to get Cop City on the ballot to let the people decide. Falling short of that goal doesn't mean that members of the campaign have to cease operations entirely, but the campaign does owe community members who offered up their personal information in pursuit of that specific outcome an explanation as to what has changed, why it has changed, and what their personal information is going to be used for going forward. Were the signers even informed of the possibility that signing the petition would subject them to receiving campaign mailers or other such communication? An ulterior motive to use personal information collected for the referendum campaign in pursuit of electoral organizing for city council candidates smacks of opportunism and sows distrust amongst community members and movement allies. What is even more perplexing is that the campaign hasn't publicly identified or endorsed any candidates running for city council, instead speaking in generalities about the need to replace the current members.

In addition to being somewhat misleading, this change in tactics fails to take into consideration the opinions of the petition signers themselves. Does the community want this campaign to refocus its sights on electoral organizing for city council seats? It's unclear if the referendum campaign organizers have even asked this question. Given the campaign's refusal and/or inability to publicly reckon with its missteps, you'd be forgiven for surmising that they likely haven't.

How we got to this point is an important lesson for organizers all over who seek to disrupt the status quo. The Cop City referendum campaign should serve as a cautionary tale as to what happens when organizers choose to wage battle on the state's terms. This post-mortem will go beyond the merits of the referendum strategy itself and also address the pitfalls associated with electoral organizing as a theory of change.

Diverse Tactics; Difficult Questions

As far as criticism goes, disruptive tactics - which is to say, tactics that the state usually labels as "violent," "extreme," or "terroristic" - get a disproportionate share relative to tactics that follow institutional processes. Such disruptive tactics are routinely labeled as divisive, exercises in adventurism, or counterproductive to movements. While inoffensive on their face, tactics that engage the state on its terms can be divisive and counterproductive in their own right. Despite this, tactics that follow institutional processes yet are responsible for changing the trajectory of a movement are largely not subjected to the same heightened scrutiny as their disruptive counterparts.

The goal of this piece isn't to delegitimize the importance of a diversity of tactics, but rather highlight key questions that we must ask ourselves before we devote finite resources to a course of action. They are questions that we must keep present in our minds while we are organizing alongside one another as we strive for some semblance of harmony between different approaches. These questions will help us guard against movement capture and co-optation, which I am loosely defining here as the process by which funding and/or disproportionate access to it materially alters the direction of a movement.

Movement capture need not involve a nefarious plot to redirect the energy of a movement. Even well-intentioned endeavors can result in movement capture if we are not vigilant and self-critical of our actions. Ultimately, I don't believe the referendum campaign was born of bad faith or designed to siphon and redirect energy from the broader movement to stop Cop City (although I understand that opinions on this do vary). The road to hell is paved with good intentions, and good intentions alone are not enough to avoid the pitfalls inherent in engaging the state on its terrain. While many may want to preserve friendships or relationships with well-meaning people, we can't be afraid to ask difficult questions or offer incisive criticism. The questions below were crafted with the referendum campaign as a frame of reference, but are questions that are broadly applicable to organizing campaigns (especially when these campaigns seek to engage the electoral or democratic process).

1. Have similar attempts to influence policy via formal processes been made, and if so, what were the results? Are our actions in line with the community's desires and goals? What other tactics are being utilized to pursue our goal, and what can we learn from them?

2. How easily can the pursuit of our goal be subverted by bureaucracy, litigation, legislation, or political forces? Do we have viable strategies to overcome these roadblocks?

3. Is our decision-making structure transparent, inclusive, and open to ideas and criticism? Is power over the organizing strategy consolidated with a person, group, or entity? Are we transparent about how our strategy is being funded? Does our strategy have funding disproportionate to other tactics?

4. Does our strategy take up disproportionate space (in media, online, or otherwise in the movement ecosystem)? Will this have an impact on other tactics within the broader movement and the perception of the movement as a whole?

5. Are we building relationships and connections that will outlast this specific moment and issue?

6. What tangible benefits will we have to show if we are successful? Does victory look like getting someone elected? Have we considered the practical limitations of electoral organizing? What methods of control or accountability will there be over a politician if the campaign to elect them is successful?

7. Are we safeguarding the contact information that we collected and using it for our stated goal?

Final Thoughts

Unquestionably there will never be unanimous agreement on the most effective strategy or tactic among organizers. The calculus is different for each individual as to what they are willing to risk, how much time they can devote, and what kind of resources they have access to. If our goal is to change the system, not merely have our hand on the wheel of it, then we need to be brutally honest about the limitations of electoral politics. Electoral campaigns inherently are individualizing in nature, usually elevating a person above the causes they purport to stand for. Candidates are regularly bought by moneyed special interests, bent to the will of the establishment, or otherwise drift from the radical values they campaigned on. Further still, the critical mass for enacting meaningful change goes far beyond a single candidate or campaign.

The referendum offered a different vision: a chance for the people to decide on an issue directly. Even stripped of politicians, the campaign succumbed to the machinations of bureaucracy. With the goal of getting Cop City on the ballot no longer in sight, the campaign now has chosen to descend further into the depths of electoral politics. At what point does a mere difference in tactics become harmful to a movement? Are we able to draw the line between a healthy disagreement and something that siphons energy from a movement and redirects it into a dead end? As the referendum campaign has shown, even well intentioned efforts can be harmful if we do not exercise care in how we participate in a system that we are trying to upend. How to balance that equation is a question we should all be struggling with together.